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Symposium – Blocking the Courthouse Door: Federal Civil
Procedure Obstacles to Justice
Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty
Michael Vitiello*

In Animating Civil Procedure, I argued that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
used procedural law as a way to narrow access to our courts.1 Most often, the right
wing of the Court has led the way and done so in cases where powerful entities,
often mega-corporations, are the beneficiaries of the Court’s decision. 2 I further
argued that the public does not react to such decisions or if members of the public
do so, their responses are far more tepid than their responses to the Court’s
controversial substantive decisions. 3 The net result of the Court’s procedural
activism is to erode the rule of law: access to court is a hallmark of our system of
justice and closing the courthouse door prevents many defendants from answering
for harm that those entities have caused. 4
Animating Civil Procedure focused on the Roberts Court’s personal
jurisdiction case law. In the modern world of expanded interstate and international
trade and travel, with instant efficient and inexpensive communication across the
globe, one would have thought that the jurisdiction arm of our courts would
lengthen to ensure that plaintiffs have ready access to a convenient court. 5 The
Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases have repeatedly narrowed the court’s
jurisdictional reach. 6 In 2017, after publication of my book, the Court again ruled
against a group of plaintiffs in favor of a multibillion-dollar corporation in a
decision that leaves many civil procedure scholars stunned. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court (BMS) is yet another major example of the Court’s new
protection for corporate defendants. 7
Imagine that plaintiffs from around the United States used a multibillion-dollar
pharmaceutical company’s product. 8 Imagine also that resident and non-resident
* Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D. 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend my thanks to University of
Mississippi Professor of Law Michael Hoffheimer for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and
to my research assistant Amy Gassner Seilliere for her excellent work on this article.
1. MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE xiv–xv (2017).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at xiv–xv.
4. Id. at 64.
5. Id. at 22.
6. Joan R. Camagong, Recent Developments in Personal Jurisdiction, 20 A.B.A. TORTSOURCE 10 (2018).
7. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
8. Id.
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plaintiffs attempted to join in a single lawsuit against the defendant in California,
a state where the defendant has several hundred employees and maintains various
facilities, including research laboratories near the Silicon Valley, and sells
hundreds of millions of pills alleged to have caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. 9
Imagine finally that the pharmaceutical company made almost a billion dollars
from sales in California alone over a several year period. 10 Does a California court
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant such that it can hear claims not only
by Californians but also out-of-state plaintiffs?
For so many reasons, one might have thought that the corporation received
many benefits from serving the California market, had such a large “presence”
within the state, and could claim no inconvenience in defending in the forum state
that jurisdiction would be a foregone conclusion. 11 Not so under the Roberts’ Court
jurisdiction-shrinking view of due process. 12
A number of scholars have criticized BMS.13 For example, Professor Mike
Hoffheimer has called the Court’s decision part of a “stealth revolution,” whereby
the Roberts Court has spoken as if it is merely applying traditional due process
doctrine to new sets of facts. 14 The Court claims this is the case despite the fact
that it has repeatedly narrowed access to courts, radically altering traditional
doctrine.15
I use this opportunity to make a different point about BMS and the Court’s
analysis of due process. As I discussed in Animating Civil Procedure, the Court
has never offered a compelling explanation for why its due process test focuses on
anything more than whether a defendant had fair notice and an opportunity to be
heard.16 While that protection seems to underlie the Court’s “reasonableness”
analysis, the Court requires more than a showing that a defendant is not burdened
by answering a suit in an otherwise entirely convenient forum. 17
The Court’s formula for personal jurisdiction states that a defendant must have
sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state so that the assertion of jurisdiction
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 18 Most often,
when the Court has narrowed access to court, it has used the minimum contacts
part of its test to erect a barrier to suit. 19 As I have argued elsewhere, the Court has
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 27.
12. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1773.
13. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol–Myers Squibb
and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (2018); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth
Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 F LA. L. REV. 499, 504 (2018).
14. Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 505.
15. Id. at 549.
16. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 35–36.
17. Id. at 28.
18. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
19. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 36.
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never offered a compelling explanation for why minimum contacts with the forum
are important even in instances where a plaintiff has brought suit in a forum that is
uncontestably convenient for the defendant. 20 The Court has offered a number of
explanations, including briefly and unconvincingly a state’s interest to protect its
residents from being haled into court in another forum. 21 BMS seems to revert to
that explanation for the importance of the contacts part of the Court’s due process
analysis.22 Somehow, federalism explains why jurisdiction is improper for some
reason that is hard to articulate. 23
This explanation is yet another example of an unconvincing make-weight to
justify protecting corporate defendants from defending themselves in otherwise
entirely convenient fora, and indeed, often in states where those corporations are
reaping in billions of dollars from their in-state business activities.
Part I of this paper examines BMS.24 Part II examines the Court’s previous
unconvincing efforts to explain the relevance of federalism in its due process
analysis.25 It also explores the BMS Court’s justification for this rationale in light
of historic understanding of jurisdiction and in light of modern commercial
realities.26 Part III reviews scholarly efforts to explain BMS. There, I also explore
what policies might explain the willingness of the liberal wing of the Court to join
a decision that obviously favors mega-corporations.27 At the end of the day, the
Court’s analysis is a make-weight to justify shutting the courthouse door without
plausible grounding in due process. 28
I. PART I
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies
in the world with thousands of employees and about $20 billion in revenue
annually.29 While over half of its work force is in New York and New Jersey, the
company has a large footprint in California. 30 BMS has five laboratories in
California where about 160 employees work. 31 It has a sales force of about 250
20. Id. at 37; Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court’s New Personal
Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 UC DAVIS J. OF INT’L LAW & POL’Y 209, 217–18 (2015).
21. See World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. See infra Part I.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra Part II.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part III.
28. Id.
29. Bristol–Myers Squibb Company History, F UNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/comp
any-histories/bristol-myers-squibb-company-history/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
30. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
31. Id.
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people in the state and a state-government advocacy office in Sacramento. 32
BMS produces and sells Plavix, a blood thinner. 33 In the early 2000’s, Plavix
was BMS’s best-selling product.34 Indeed, in 2009, U.S. sales of Plavix exceeded
$9 billion.35 The manufacturing, labeling, and work on gaining regulatory approval
of Plavix did not take place in California. 36 Between 2006 and 2016, BMS sold
about 187 million Plavix pills in California, taking in more than $900 million from
those sales over that period of time. 37 Beyond doubt, BMS sold many other drugs
in California as well. 38
When concerns surfaced about Plavix’s side effects, a large group of plaintiffs,
including California residents and residents from 33 other states, filed complaints
against BMS in California state court. 39 The nonresident plaintiffs did not allege
any facts connecting their purchase of the drug with California or any other way
that their injuries arose out of forum activity. 40 For example, they did not allege
that they bought Plavix while they were in the state or that BMS marketed the drug
nationwide from California. 41 BMS retained McKesson Corporation,
headquartered in California, to distribute Plavix nationwide. 42 The non-California
plaintiffs, however, did not allege that McKesson’s marketed activities resulted in
their purchases of Plavix. 43
BMS moved to dismiss the nonresidents’ complaints on the grounds that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over BMS. 44 The California Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court held that the court had personal jurisdiction. 45 The United States
Supreme Court reversed. 46
The plaintiffs filed their actions in 2012, after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,47 but before the Court’s

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. John Carreyrou & Joann S. Lublin, How Bristol–Myers Fumbled Defense of $4 Billion Drug, WALL
ST. J., (Sept. 2, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115716250362552502 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
35. Eric EJ. Topol & Nicholas NJ. Schork, Catapulting Clopidogrel Pharmacogenomics Forward, 17
NATURE MED. 40, 40 (2011).
36. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
37. Id.
38. See Shop Bristol–Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals, MCKESSON, https://mms.mckesson.com/catalog?no
de=402975+5566559 (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
39. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1777.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1778.
47. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.48 Despite indications in Goodyear that the
Court was about to narrow general jurisdiction, the California trial court found that
jurisdiction was proper under a general jurisdiction theory. 49 By the time the case
arrived in the California Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court had decided Daimler,
dramatically narrowing general jurisdiction. 50 While the California appellate and
Supreme Court found that jurisdiction was not proper under a general jurisdiction
theory, they found that jurisdiction was proper under a specific jurisdiction
theory.51
Clearly, California courts had personal jurisdiction over BMS for purposes of
suits by Californian plaintiffs who purchased and used Plavix in California. 52 The
case for jurisdiction over those claims was air-tight: BMS acted with purpose in
selling the harm-causing product in-state.53 Since the development of its contacts
analysis, the Supreme Court has interchangeably stated the black letter law: a claim
had to either arise out of or be related to the defendant’s in-state contacts.54 Chief
Justice Cantil-Sakauye relied on the “related to” language to uphold jurisdiction
over BMS in claims by non-resident plaintiffs: “A claim need not arise directly
from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the
contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim
bears a substantial connection to the nonresident’s forum contacts, the exercise of
specific jurisdiction is appropriate.” 55 She went further to apply a theory
recognized by some courts: sometimes called a “sliding scale” analysis.56 Thus,
even if a claim does not arise out of the forum contacts, jurisdiction may be proper
in light of substantial contacts with the forum. The Chief Justice also found that
the assertion of jurisdiction satisfied the reasonableness part of the Supreme
Court’s due process analysis. 57
The Supreme Court disagreed. 58 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito focused
on what now seems significant (but something that in the past seemed quite
irrelevant): BMS, a massive international corporation, conducted most of its
activity outside of California. 59 Justice Alito also focused on other facts unrelated
to California. First, the nonresident plaintiffs did not obtain the drug from

48. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
49. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1778–79.
52. Id. at 1781.
53. Id. at 1786.
54. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783, 803 (2016).
56. Id. at 792.
57. Id. at 808.
58. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
59. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 57.
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California. Second, BMS did not manufacture or distribute the drug in California. 60
Third, BMS did not work on regulatory compliance material from California. 61
Finally, although Justice Alito recognized that BMS hired McKesson,
headquartered in California, to develop its marketing strategy, the nonresident
plaintiffs did not allege that BMS directed its marketing strategy from California. 62
The Court’s opinion ends any argument that a plaintiff can rely on a slidingscale approach to jurisdiction. 63 According to Justice Alito, that approach
effectively is a general jurisdiction theory dressed up in specific jurisdiction
language.64
The most important part of Justice Alito’s discussion for purposes of this paper
is his explanation of the role of federalism and state borders in defining the Court’s
due process test. In discussing the limitations imposed by Fourteenth Amendment
due process, Justice Alito did not make a clear distinction between the minimum
contacts analysis and the reasonableness part of the analysis.65 In some cases, the
Court has focused on the separate aspects of its analysis as serving distinct
interests. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court did not reach its
reasonableness analysis because it found that the defendants, a New York car
dealer and a New York—New Jersey—Connecticut distributor, lacked sufficient
contacts with the forum state because they did no purposeful act within the state. 66
Further, Justice White’s majority opinion explained the contacts part of the
analysis in federalism terms.67
Justice Alito did not make that the clear distinction between contacts analysis
and fairness-reasonableness factors.68 Instead of focusing on contacts as a separate
step in the analysis, he seemed to lump the two aspects of the Court’s test, but to
explain the due process test in terms of federalism. 69 As he stated for the Court,
“In determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, a court must consider a
variety of interests. These include ‘the interests of the forum State and of the
plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice.’” 70 Beyond
that though, he observed that the “primary concern” of the Court’s due process
analysis is “the burden on the defendant.” 71 This discussion seems like the fairnessreasonableness part of the analysis, effectively a balancing of competing interests.
What is new in the Court’s analysis is the unusual importance of the burden

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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Id. at 293.
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
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on the defendant that somehow weaves in federalism concerns. Here is a fairly
extensive quotation of that point:
Assessing this burden obviously requires a court to consider the practical
problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses
the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that
may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question . . . As we have
put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” . . . “[T]he
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The
sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of
all its sister States” . . . And at times, this federalism interest may be
decisive. As we explained in World–Wide Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the
defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to
litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” 72
As indicated above, the Court previously organized the analysis differently,
first deciding the sufficiency of the contacts and second, only if the contacts were
sufficient would it turn to the reasonableness factors. 73 In Justice White’s view,
federalism explained the contacts part of the analysis, while the due process
assessment would follow only after a court found sufficient contacts. 74 Justice
Alito merged the questions: in evaluating the burden on the defendant, a court must
evaluate federalism and state sovereignty considerations. 75
After reciting the special importance of the burden on the defendant (with
particular emphasis on sovereignty), the Court seemed to return to the lack of
sufficient contacts with the forum. It did not find, for example, that BMS faced any
particular burden in defending the several suits in California.76 That is, while BMS
had extensive contacts with the forum, the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims did not
arise out of those contacts. 77 Perhaps the case did not turn on any special burden
faced by BMS in defending in California because it admitted that it faced no special

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1776, 1780
Id. at 1780.
World–Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294.
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
Id. at 1781.
Id.
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burden in defending there. 78
In finding that the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims
violated due process, Justice Alito insisted that the Court was applying traditional
due process principles. 79 That is more than debatable.80 The next section focuses
on some of the Court’s earlier efforts to explain the significance of states’ interest
in the jurisdictional arena.
II. PART II
Professor Rich Freer and Dean Wendy Perdue’s case book poses a question in
notes after International Shoe v. Washington. The hypothetical starts with an
International Shoe delivery truck striking a pedestrian in Colorado. 81 The
pedestrian has a vacation home in Illinois, located quite close to St. Louis,
Missouri, where International Shoe has its headquarters. Deciding that it would be
quite convenient to litigate in Illinois, the pedestrian wants to file suit in that state.
The editors ask whether the pedestrian can do so. 82
The question presents students with the tension between contacts analysis and
what would seem to be the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause. Assume that, instead of merely being convenient to bring suit
in Illinois, the pedestrian had an especially strong interest in filing suit there. For
example, assume that the Colorado accident led to significant physical impairment,
leaving him bedridden and in need of special care provided near his Illinois home.
Indeed, add an additional fact: the nearest courthouse in Missouri is located many
miles further away from International Shoe’s headquarters than is the courthouse
in Illinois. Would an Illinois court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over
International Shoe really violate due process? 83
The answer is counterintuitive and unequivocally, yes. But the reason why is
more of a historical anomaly than it is a matter of principle.
Think back to Pennoyer v. Neff.84 There, attorney Mitchell sued farmer Neff,
one of his clients, for payment of a fee for legal services. Mitchell began the suit
in personam but had process served by publication in a newspaper, the appropriate
method for commencing a suit in rem. 85 When Neff did not respond to the suit, the
court entered a default judgment. 86 To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff sold land

78. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1277.
79. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1779; Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 523.
80. Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 523.
81. RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS 44 (7th ed. 2016).
82. Id.
83. Cf. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 36.
84. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
85. Id. at 714–15.
86. Id. at 720.
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that Neff owned. 87 Subsequently, Neff sued Pennoyer, who had bought the land
after the sheriff’s sale, for ejectment. 88 Pennoyer claimed ownership through the
default judgment.89
The Supreme Court found for Neff. 90 A court would have to give effect to a
judgment unless the judgment was improperly entered. 91 Here, the Court found
that the judgment was improper: the action was one in personam but Neff was not
served in-hand, in-state in the original action. 92 The Court reasoned that a state
lacks authority to reach into another state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant in
that state.93 A contrary holding would violate principles of international law: one
sovereign lacks the authority to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. 94
Had that been the end of the Court’s analysis, the Court would have spared
generations of law students the horror of reading its ornate decision. But in an
elaborate dicta, the Court reasoned that its holding found support in the recently
enacted Fourteenth Amendment. 95
Linking the requirement of in-hand, in-state service, seemingly justified based
on principles of public international law, and Fourteenth Amendment due process
is certainly an odd connection. 96 The international law principle defends the rights
of sovereign states.97 The Fourteenth Amendment by its own terms limits states’
power.98 Indeed, the Civil War largely repudiated the international principle that
states within the union retained full sovereign powers. 99
The Court would eventually recognize Pennoyer’s fallacy. Even while
searching for a new explanation of the role of state sovereignty in its due process
analysis, the Court rejected “the shibboleth that ‘[t]he authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is
established,’” i.e., Pennoyer’s rationale.100
The evolution of the Court’s due process analysis from Pennoyer to modern
contacts analysis is a familiar story. The development of modern transportation
ushered in the need for expanding the states’ jurisdictional reach: a motorist from

87. Id. at 724.
88. Id. at 715.
89. Id. at 720.
90. Id. at 736.
91. Id. at 728.
92. Id. at 727–28.
93. Id. at 733.
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id. at 732.
96. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 23.
97. Harold S. Lewis, Three Deaths of State Sovereignty and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence
of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 704 (1983).
98. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City
of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 169 (1998).
99. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 23.
100. World–Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293.

521

2019 / Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty
out-of-state could cause damage in-state and leave before in-hand, in-state service
of process.101 States created consent statutes, initially requiring an out-of-state
motorist to appoint an in-state agent for purpose of receiving service of process. 102
Eventually, states adopted implied consent statutes, whereby driving on a state’s
highway amounted to consent that allowed an injured person to serve the out-ofstate resident with process by serving a state official. 103
International Shoe, a corporation with its headquarters in Missouri, had a
workforce in Washington. 104 Over the course of several years, it refused to pay
funds into Washington’s unemployment compensation fund. 105 The Court rejected
International Shoe’s efforts to frame the question of personal jurisdiction in terms
of corporate presence in-state.106 Instead, it reformulated the test in now-familiar
terms: “due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 107 Commentators have
observed that International Shoe does not provide much in the way of a clear
theoretical framework. 108 In reliance on cases that had eroded Pennoyer’s rigid
rule, the Court focused on notions of quid pro quo: a defendant with sufficient
contacts with the forum state benefitted from in-state contacts, creating a reciprocal
benefit to respond to a suit in-state.109 The Court also made a passing reference to
“our federal system of government.” 110
While International Shoe pointed in different directions on the relationship of
due process and state sovereignty, McGee v. International Life seemed to have
developed a coherent theory. 111 There, a Texas insurance company refused to pay
the proceeds of a life insurance policy to McGee, the named beneficiary of the
policy, after her son died. 112 McGee sued in California; International Life failed to
appear and McGee received a default judgment. 113 When McGee attempted to
collect on the judgment, the Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment on

101. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v. N.J., 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
102. Edwin W. Scott & Michael R. Bradley, Civil Procedure—Nonresident Motorist Statutes—Extent to
Which Jurisdiction May Be Acquired, 7 VILL. L. REV. 472, 473 (1962).
103. Id. at 474.
104. Id. at 310.
105. Id. at 311.
106. Id. at 315.
107. Id. at 316.
108. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W.
L. REV. 774, 775 (2016).
109. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
110. Id. at 317.
111. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 27.
112. Id. at 222.
113. Id. at 221.
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grounds that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.114
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black’s opinion articulated the modern
view of due process. 115 The Court focused on the ease of modern transportation
and communication as relevant to the Court’s analysis. 116 Unlike Pennoyer, which
focused on the defendant’s state’s interest, McGee recognized the original forum
state’s interest in protecting its citizens.117 The Court balanced a number of
competing factors, including the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum
state, witness convenience, and the plaintiff’s need for the original forum. 118
Language in McGee suggested the overarching theme: did the assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant by a California court deny the defendant fair notice
and the opportunity to be heard?119 If the answer was no, then the court did not
violate the defendant’s due process rights. 120
I have argued elsewhere that McGee is the only case in which the Court
articulated a coherent theory of due process. 121 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause makes no reference to states’ interests and its drafters were clearly
repudiating the assertion by Southern States that they were separate sovereigns that
were free to leave the Union. 122 That view of McGee finds linguistic support in the
amendment: the assertion of jurisdiction does deprive a defendant of property or,
perhaps, liberty, but if the defendant had fair notice and an opportunity to defend
the suit, the judgment was valid. 123
McGee’s approach seemed to prevail for over twenty years despite a brief
detour six months after the Court decided McGee.124 Donner, a Pennsylvania
resident, consulted with a Delaware trust company before she moved to Florida. 125
Donner set up a trust amounting to about one-third of her estate that would go to
one of her daughters’ children upon Donner’s death. 126 Meanwhile, she left the
other two-thirds of her estate to her other two daughters, who would benefit from
her will.127 Over an eight-year period, the trust company corresponded with
Donner after she moved to Florida, where she died. 128
The two daughters who were to inherit about $500,000 each under Donner’s
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 27; Vitiello, supra note 20, at 216–19.
VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 35.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238 (1958).
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 239–340.
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will sought to have the Florida probate court rule that the Delaware trust was
invalid.129 Had they succeeded, the trust funds would have become part of
Donner’s estate and would have gone to the two daughters. 130 The Florida court
found that it had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company. 131 At the same time,
Elizabeth Hanson, whose sons were to receive the proceeds from the trust, brought
suit in Delaware to have the trust upheld. 132 The Delaware court found for
Hanson.133 Hanson v. Denckla presented the Court with difficult issues, including
the personal jurisdiction question. 134
If the Court had applied its newly minted test from McGee, the two sisters
would have undone Donner’s donative intent and deprived their nephews of their
inheritance.135 The Court divided 5-4 and found that the Florida court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company. 136 Chief Justice Warren
explained away McGee: although McGee failed to make the distinction, the Chief
Justice claimed that International Life’s contact with the forum state came about
through purposeful activity in the forum state. 137 Justice Black’s dissent pointed
out that the trust company certainly knew that it had contact with Florida: it
maintained a business relationship with Donner over an eight-year period.138 The
Chief Justice also rebutted the idea that state boundaries did not matter for due
process analysis: constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction “are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” 139
For many years, courts treated McGee as the law, often ignoring or giving short
shrift to Hanson.140 After all, not only was Hanson a 5-4 decision, but its resultorientation was palpable. 141 McGee found favor among many lower courts,
including state courts that were expanding their reach, often to protect in-state
residents against out-of-state corporate defendants. 142 Indeed, while narrowing in
rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court seemed to endorse McGee’s
framework: there, the Court observed that the “mutually exclusive sovereignty of
the States” was not a “central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.” 143
As observed above, sovereignty made a comeback in World-Wide Volkswagen
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Corp. v. Woodson in 1980.144 World-Wide created a two-step framework for
analysis: first, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state. 145 Second, only if the defendant had
sufficient minimum contacts would the Court turn to the fairness-reasonableness
factors.146 As I often quip when teaching the case, this was something of an unholy
marriage of McGee (the reasonableness factors) and Hanson (the contacts
requirement). In dicta, Justice White endorsed the stream of commerce basis for
jurisdiction; that is jurisdiction would be proper when a defendant shipped a
component part to a state other than the forum state with awareness that the product
would end up in the forum).147 However, he insisted for the majority that only
contacts that demonstrated purposeful availment of the forum met the due process
test.148
Justice White’s authority for the latter proposition was, of course, Hanson.149
Despite having laid dormant since 1958, Hanson now came center stage in the
Court’s new due process analysis. 150 But what interest was served by the contacts
part of the test? While disavowing Pennoyer’s “shibboleth,” Justice White asserted
that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established.” 151
Hanson’s reemergence left commentators befuddled. 152 If Pennoyer’s reliance
on state sovereignty was rightly called “shibboleth,” how did the contacts analysis
serve some state interest? Well, Justice White explained a mere two years after
World-Wide that it did not serve a separate interest. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, Justice White recanted:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That
Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.153
That certainly seems right, based on the language of the Due Process Clause
and its history as a limitation on state power. 154 Indeed, writing shortly after the
Court decided Insurance Corp. of Ireland, one scholar predicted that the decision
144.
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151.
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Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
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signaled the death of the relevance of sovereignty as part of the personal
jurisdictional analysis: “Since the Court, so soon after World-Wide, reached so
far to dispose of state sovereignty, this third death of the concept should prove
more durable.”155 That prognosis, although seemingly incontestable, did not prove
accurate.156
Sovereignty and the contacts analysis, somehow distinct from basic fairness,
did not die. Further, the Court has not developed a coherent theory to explain the
increasingly important role that minimum contacts serves. That is, if McGee
controls, the contacts analysis is not a separate bar to jurisdiction. 157
Justice Kennedy, writing for only four justices, claimed that the purposeful
availment mattered because it signaled that the defendant intended to affiliate with
the forum, in effect, consenting to that state’s jurisdiction. 158 Critics jumped on that
rationale: Justice Kennedy seemed to be reintroducing the widely ridiculed and
rejected implied consent rationale. 159 In subsequent cases, Justice Kennedy did not
re-urge his theory. 160
Fast-forward to the Court’s decision in BMS. Justice Alito did not bifurcate
the analysis as Justice White did in World-Wide.161 Instead, he seemed to be
discussing the reasonableness factors, which include the burden on the
defendant.162 But when he explained why a court had to give special weight to the
burden on the defendant, the ghost of sovereignty emerged:
Assessing this burden obviously requires a court to consider the practical
problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses
the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that
may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question. As we have
put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States” . . . [T]he
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. 163
I confess that I have little idea what Justice Alito, along with seven of his
colleagues, mean in the language quoted above. I also confess that I hear a faint

155. Lewis, supra note 97, at 702.
156. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
157. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 44.
158. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011).
159. Id. at 901 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160. See Amanda Iler, Bridging the Stream of Commerce: Recommendations for Living in the PostNicastro Era, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 407, 412–13 (2013).
161. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1776.
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groan, Justice White’s voice saying, didn’t you read my mea culpa in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland? I cannot find a plausible explanation for the Court’s revived
sovereignty theory. BMS merely reasserted, without plausible explanation, why
state borders matter.
Make no bones about it, though: the reliance on sovereignty and the
importance of state borders narrows access to convenient fora for plaintiffs. In
BMS, BMS conceded that defending suit in California was not inconvenient.164
How could it be inconvenient? It had to defend numerous suits brought by
California citizens.165 The parties consolidated the suits. 166 Discovery would
overlap in all of the suits. 167 BMS has a substantial corporate presence in the state
and makes many millions of dollars on its California business. 168 No doubt, it
retains a large staff of lawyers in California.169 A claim that it would not have fair
notice and an opportunity to be heard on all of the claims, by in-state and out-ofstate plaintiffs would be frivolous.170 But future plaintiffs face fewer convenient
places to sue mega-corporations where those plaintiffs choose to file their suits
based on the BMS Court’s new, narrow view of relatedness, a new rule required in
some unexplained way by state sovereignty. 171
Lest my comments seem flip, in the next section, I visit some scholarly
attempts to explain or to justify the reliance on sovereignty.
III. PART III
Some scholars gave BMS a chilly response. 172 For example, Professor
Hoffheimer has argued that BMS is yet another example of the Roberts’ Court’s
attempt to portray its radical new due process analysis as flowing naturally from
controlling precedent. 173 A few scholars have attempted to justify or at least explain
the Court’s theory.
Professor Jeffrey Schmitt has argued “that the law of personal jurisdiction
must take sovereignty into serious account.” 174 Schmitt’s Rethinking the State
Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction offers “a new interpretation of how

164. Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1781.
166. Id. at 1784.
167. Id. at 1786–87.
168. Id. at 1778.
169. Job Search Results, BRISTOL–MYERS SQUIBB, https://www.bms.com/job-seekers/job-search-results
.html?country=united%20states%20of%20america&state=california&category=legal (last visited Oct. 4, 2018)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
170. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 57.
171. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct at 1780.
172. See Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 504; see also Schmitt, supra note 108.
173. Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 505.
174. Schmitt, supra note 108, at 769.
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sovereignty should inform the doctrine.” 175 Schmitt is clear that his theoretical
justification is “a new argument.” 176 In summary, his thesis is as follows: “as a
matter of state sovereignty, a state court may exercise jurisdiction only over a
defendant that engaged in conduct that significantly implicated interests within the
sphere of the state’s sovereign power, that is, the health, safety, and general welfare
of its people.”177
Schmitt begins his argument with the recognition that the Court has yet to
articulate a coherent theory of sovereignty in its personal jurisdiction case law. 178
While many scholars conclude from the lack of coherent theory that none exists, 179
Schmitt wants to find such a justification, almost certainly as part of larger
Federalist perspective, limiting not only federal but state power.180
At its core, Schmitt argues that state governments have full sovereign power
within their borders, unlike the federal government (a government limited by the
specific powers granted in the Constitution).181 That sovereign power is affirmed
in the Tenth Amendment.182 While each state is analogous to a sovereign state, the
states’ powers come from the people: each state’s “general power of governing.” 183
Each state’s power to regulate is largely limited by its borders. A state’s police
power “authorizes the assertion of adjudicatory power within the state.” 184 But
geography limits states’ power: “it is more difficult to justify a state’s assertion of
sovereignty—whether regulatory or adjudicatory—over an out-of-state
defendant.” 185 Schmitt relies on cases dealing with the states’ regulatory power:
“In the regulatory context, the Supreme Court has held that a state cannot directly
regulate conduct ‘that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders.’” 186 Thus,
states cannot assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, a limitation grounded in the
Commerce Clause.187
Schmitt acknowledges that the Court’s case law on extraterritorial jurisdiction
is not without its problems. He recognizes that this idea of limiting the
extraterritorial effect of a state’s power creates difficulties: “virtually every state
regulation has effects beyond its borders.” 188 But he relies on this line of cases to
175. Id.
176. Id. at 772.
177. Id. at 773.
178. Id. at 775.
179. Id. at 771.
180. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State Power: State Regulation,
Choice of Law, and Slavery, 83 MISS. L. J. 59, 62 (2014).
181. Schmitt, supra note 108, at 780.
182. Id. at 779.
183. Id. at 780 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 780–81.
188. Id. at 781.
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make his core argument: that, as a general rule, states cannot project their laws on
disputes that have nothing to do with conduct in their own borders.189
The cases limiting extraterritorial application of a state’s laws are the
regulatory cases referred to above. 190 But Schmitt urges that those cases be applied
with equal force to the adjudicatory cases, i.e., the personal jurisdiction cases. 191
Schmitt’s position seems partially prescriptive and partially descriptive when he
argues that “[s]tate sovereignty concerns are equally applicable to the assertion of
adjudicatory power over an out-of-state defendant as to the extraterritorial
application of state regulatory power.” 192 That is, he urges that the Court apply
principles from its regulatory case law, and apply them to personal jurisdiction
cases—the adjudicatory rules. He recognizes that constitutional text does not
justify his theoretical argument, but he finds it in the structure of federalism. 193 At
the same time, he does not cite any Supreme Court case that has adopted his
particular explanation for their results, other than in generalized federalism
concerns.194 Thus, Schmitt argues that the Court should adopt his theory,
presumably because it will produce sound results.
That raises a number of questions. As indicated, Schmitt does not seriously
contend that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause justifies
adoption of his sovereignty theory. 195 To argue otherwise is implausible since the
amendment is clearly a limitation on state power.196 What about the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment as it relates to the assertion of personal jurisdiction?
Indeed, the history of the amendment seems to undercut a core principle of
Schmitt’s theory. 197 And if history and text do not support a jurisdiction-narrowing
rule, are there nonetheless good policy reasons to adopt a sovereignty-based theory
of jurisdiction? Schmitt’s theory adapts rules from cases dealing with the
regulatory power of the states and grafts them onto the adjudicatory power of the
states.198 Does sound policy urge such a move? In an age of expanded interstate
and international dealings, his jurisdiction-narrowing rule seems to make little
sense.199
Pennoyer supports the federalism-structural view of personal jurisdiction. 200
189. Id. at 782.
190. See supra Part II.
191. Schmitt, supra note 108, at 782.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 778.
195. Id. at 782.
196. See Peter Singleton, Personal Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, HASTINGS L.J. 911, 917 (2008).
197. See generally Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981).
198. Schmitt, supra note 108, at 780.
199. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 22.
200. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1977).

529

2019 / Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty
Unless a plaintiff had an out-of-state defendant served in-hand, in-state, the court
could not assert jurisdiction over that defendant. 201 Thus, in Pennoyer, courts could
not reach beyond Oregon’s borders to command a defendant in California to return
to Oregon to respond to a suit in Oregon. 202 Wait: does that really support Schmitt’s
theory? Does borrowing limits on the regulatory power of one state to dictate
conduct of citizens of other states work in many cases? His theory works based
on the facts in Pennoyer: the suit in Mitchell v. Neff, the case that gave rise to the
judgment that led to the sheriff’s sale, was for a breach of contract. 203 Neff failed
to pay for legal services that Mitchell rendered in Oregon. Hence, the Oregon suit
would turn on the application of Oregon state law. But such a conclusion is hardly
inevitable when Pennoyer’s in-hand, in-state rule applied.
A classic question to pose to students after they have read Pennoyer is what
should Mitchell have done if he could not find Neff in Oregon? One hypothetical
might ask whether suing and serving Neff in California would work. The answer
is clearly yes. Many students balk if one spins off a different hypothetical: what if
Mitchell sued Neff in Idaho, based on the same conduct? 204 Again, some students
find the result counterintuitive, clearly the Idaho court would have personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. In such a case, wouldn’t the Idaho court be
regulating extraterritorial conduct, seemingly in contradiction to one of Schmitt’s
premises? The answer might be, no, Idaho would apply Oregon law and so would
not be enforcing its own policies. 205
Maybe. Would Idaho apply Oregon law to Mitchell’s contract claim?
Probably.206 Depending on Idaho’s choice of law rules, in theory, Idaho might
apply Idaho substantive law. Would that mean that personal jurisdiction was not
proper? It might raise concerns under the Supreme Court’s precedent limiting a
state’s authority to apply its own law to a dispute. 207 But historically, personal
jurisdiction was proper beyond serious debate.
A similar problem might have arisen if, for example, Mitchell learned that Neff
owned property in Idaho and began his suit in rem by attaching that property.
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Similar problems arise: the Idaho court might apply its substantive law to the
dispute and would again be regulating extraterritorial conduct (contract formation
in Oregon). But under the law according to Pennoyer, the court would have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. 208
Take that one step further: assume that, had the out-of-state plaintiffs begun
suit against BMS in California by attaching its substantial property holdings in
California, under the law according to Pennoyer, the suit would not have violated
due process.209 That would have been the case until 1978, when the Court narrowed
assertions of in rem jurisdiction. 210 What was clear as an historical matter,
sovereignty did not prevent such suits.211
Yet another example demonstrates that Schmitt’s sovereignty theory,
grounded in limits on the extraterritorial application of a state’s law, has little
historical support. At the outset of their decision to sue BMS, the plaintiffs believed
that the California courts would have general jurisdiction over BMS. 212 In such a
case, one would need to determine, under California’s choice of law rules, which
states’ substantive laws would control the litigation. 213 Apparently, BMS feared
that California would apply its pro-plaintiff substantive law, instead of the various
out-of-state plaintiffs’ state law. 214 But until Goodyear and Daimler, BMS’s
substantial California contacts would have been sufficient to uphold jurisdiction. 215
Again, that question would have been quite distinct from the choice of law
question.
Although the Court has narrowed in rem and general jurisdiction, consider one
more example where a state applies its law to regulate extraterritorial conduct:
Imagine a defendant from Alaska on a week-long vacation in Florida, where a
plaintiff from Alaska begins suit against the defendant. While the Court was deeply
divided with no clear rule emerging, all nine justices who decided Burnham v.
Superior Court would uphold jurisdiction on those facts.216 Yet again, we don’t
know whether the Florida court would apply Florida law in the dispute, but that
would not bear on the jurisdictional questions. 217
In the previous examples, courts would have had jurisdiction over the
defendant or property. A separate question would be which states’ substantive law
would apply. In the examples, I would wager that the forum state would apply
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some other state’s substantive law under its choice of law principles. 218 But a
contrary holding would not deprive the court the power to hear the case.
Schmitt fails to address a particularly difficult question if sovereignty really
matters in personal jurisdiction analysis. His theory largely resuscitates Justice
White’s World-Wide Volkswagen position.219 The reaction of World-Wide
Volkswagen was swift and loud: if sovereignty underlies contacts analysis, how
can an individual waive personal jurisdiction? 220 Even prior to Pennoyer, courts
recognized that defendants can consent to jurisdiction. 221 By contrast, as is well
established, parties cannot consent to a federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. 222 The difference, of course, is that states have an interest in limiting
federal court subject matter jurisdiction, as reflected in Article III’s narrow
delegation of judicial power.223 As a result, private litigants cannot waive subject
matter jurisdiction. If, as Schmitt asserts, personal jurisdiction analysis must take
into account extraterritorial application of a state’s laws, how can a private
individual consent to jurisdiction in such a case? I find no answer in Rethinking
the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction. 224
If the text and history of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause do not
dictate a significant role, if any, for sovereignty as a jurisdiction limiting principle,
are there sound policies to support Schmitt’s thesis? No, as I have argued
elsewhere.225 We live in an era of interstate and international commerce when
communication and transportation may make the burden of defending a suit in a
faraway forum almost non-existent.226 BMS admitted as much before the Supreme
Court.227 Also as I argued in Animating Civil Procedure, the obvious winners of
the Court’s new restrictive due process analysis are often mega-corporations.228
One might ask whether policies other than a pro-corporate bias may have been
at play in BMS. As two professors have argued, BMS was a case about forumshopping.229 Indeed, as Professors Bradt and Rave argue in Aggregation on
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Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort
Litigation, BMS’s lasting impact is likely to be on “the balance of power in
complex litigation.” 230 As developed below, perhaps the Court was more
concerned about inappropriate forum-shopping than about basic personal
jurisdiction doctrine.
Upon filing in-state court in California, the plaintiffs in BMS seemed to have
succeeded in significant forum-shopping, including blocking BMS from removing
the action to federal court. 231 By joining BMS’s marketing firm McKesson, BMS
could not remove the action to federal court.232 By filing separately, rather than by
seeking class certification, the plaintiffs avoided removal under the Class Action
Fairness Act, which allows removal even absent complete diversity and even if a
defendant is an in-state defendant. 233 Thus, the plaintiffs seemed to skirt two
developments that have often frustrated mass-tort plaintiffs. 234 As summarized by
Bradt and Rave:
When, in the 1990s, numerous decisions by federal courts made it difficult
to certify mass-tort class actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers turned to more
accommodating states. To combat that tactic, defense-friendly interest
groups convinced Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA), which expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction to return them
to hostile federal courts.235
BMS succeeded in outmaneuvering the plaintiffs by winning its motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 236
The result of the Court’s holding in BMS largely favors defendants in the
forum-shopping arena. Plaintiffs must either sue in their home states, if that is
where they used a defendant’s product, or in a place where a corporate defendant
is “at home.” 237 In the vast majority of cases, a defendant is at home only in its
state of incorporation or the state where it has its principal place of business.238 In
the first instance, the group of plaintiffs joining in the suit is likely to be smaller
than had BMS been decided in plaintiffs’ favor. 239 Although not inevitable, large
corporate defendants will often have a home court advantage in states where they
are “at home.” That would seem to follow from the defendant’s choice to affiliate
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with the state where it is at home. 240 Further, local citizens may favor a large
corporation that provides jobs and tax revenue to their local economy over
plaintiffs from around the country, who may seem like interlopers. 241
Bradt and Rave, however, posit a third option. The third option is to file in
their own home courts, if they can assert jurisdiction over the defendant based on
a specific jurisdiction theory.242 But if the plaintiffs want efficiency, they can file
in federal court and then use the special venue provision, § 1407,243 allowing a
transfer of venue for purposes of pretrial proceedings. This thesis offers an
interesting insight into BMS.
Depending on the forum and circumstances, plaintiffs and defendants
sometimes favor mass-tort litigation. 244 Litigation against large corporations, like
the tobacco industry, invited collaboration among plaintiffs. 245 Plaintiffs may be
able to locate extremely pro-plaintiff state courts, often in rural areas where jurors
and judges showed a dislike for large out-of-state corporations.246 In some
instances, defendants and business groups have favored aggregation of claims. 247
For example, in the 1960s, insurance companies sought to use interpleader as a
way to take control of litigation, forcing injured plaintiffs to try their cases as part
of a larger interpleader action. 248 A defendant corporation might favor aggregation
of claims in a jurisdiction where the state allows liberal use of offensive issue
preclusion.249 Often, as Bradt and Rave suggest, a preference for aggregation may
depend on where aggregation will take place. 250 As CAFA demonstrates,
defendants have felt more at home in federal than in state courts for over a
decade.251 Given recent developments in Congress’s frustration of President
Obama’s appointment of judges to the federal bench 252 and Congress’s
collaboration with President Trump to reshape the federal bench, 253 that tendency
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no doubt will continue.
Insofar as BMS is a case about forum selection in mass-tort cases, who is the
winner? MDL has real advantages, including very significant cost savings for the
courts and for the litigants. 254 Often, MDL ends the litigation with the judge
moving the case to a global settlement. 255 That seems like a net win for all of us,
including plaintiffs and defendants. 256 Bradt and Rave suggest that the solution,
although not ideal, “offers potential benefits to plaintiffs and the court system as
well by creating opportunities for mass resolution that can benefit all parties.” 257
Viewed as such, one might understand why three of the more liberal justices joined
even though the decision tends to close the courthouse door in favor of large
corporations over injured plaintiffs.
Perhaps Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion
out of concern about undue forum-shopping. In Animating Civil Procedure, I
speculated that the liberal justices might have narrowed general jurisdiction, for
example, out of concern about unwarranted forum-shopping, rather than a simple
pro-corporate bias.258 But, as Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurring
opinion in Daimler, overly expansive use of general jurisdiction could have been
addressed with a less extreme solution than the majority’s extreme revision of
general jurisdiction standards. 259
In addition, the Court has not addressed openly why it disfavors plaintiffforum-shopping.260 Its decisions, including BMS, favor defendant-forum-shopping
over plaintiff’s forum selection. 261 The Court had an opportunity to decide the case
on different grounds. For example, during oral argument, Justice Kagan asked
what made the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court unconstitutionally
unfair.262 BMS’s counsel objected to “California’s supposedly biased procedural
and choice-of-law rules,” 263 while counsel had to admit that the burden on
defending in California was virtually non-existent.264 BMS’s position seemed to
dictate examination of whether California had a sufficient interest to apply its
substantive law to a dispute arising elsewhere. 265 That poses a very different
question than involved in BMS and revisiting the extent to which a state can apply
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its law to a dispute arising elsewhere might be timely. Such a decision might
squarely address unfair forum-shopping while keeping the courthouse door open
in an otherwise convenient forum. 266
Consistent with Bradt and Rave’s article, one might also see BMS as an
effective way to handle mass-tort litigation. 267 Legal experts have long been
concerned about developing an efficient method of handling mass-tort cases268 On
occasion, as with CAFA269 and with § 1369,270 Congress has created narrow
provisions to deal mass-tort and class action cases. But Congress has never created
a “bill of peace” for litigation generally. 271 Think back to the 1960s, when the
insurance industry tried to use interpleader as a way to control tort litigation. For
example, in State Farm v. Tashire, State Farm insured a driver in a major collision
that occurred in northern California. 272 Several injured plaintiffs filed actions
against the bus company and truck driver involved in the action. 273 State Farm filed
an interpleader action in federal court in Oregon, a state that seemingly had nothing
to do with the accident. 274 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the use of
federal statutory interpleader was proper.275
When I teach Tashire, I try to get my students to see the brilliance of the
attempted defense industry strategy. Subject matter jurisdiction was proper in
federal court because § 1335 requires only minimal diversity. 276 Personal
jurisdiction was proper based on § 2361, allowing for nationwide service of
process.277 Further, the federal court would apply the choice of law rules of the
state where the federal court sits. 278 Finally, interpleader is one of the exceptions
to § 2283, the anti-injunction statute. 279 Thus, the federal court has the power to
enjoin state proceedings from the same accident.280 The district court found that
interpleader was proper and enjoined the state proceedings. The Ninth Circuit
found that interpleader was improper.281 While the Supreme Court found that
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interpleader was proper, it held that the district court abused its discretion in
enjoining the state court proceedings. 282
The Supreme Court recognized the defendants’ concerns about multiple
litigation of claims arising from the same transaction. 283 Importantly, the Court
ruled that Congress had not enacted a Bill of Peace. 284 In effect, the Court held that
the lower court was using a procedural device as a Bill of Peace, well beyond its
intended procedural effect. 285
If Bradt and Rave are correct, BMS fell into the same trap as did the lower
court in Tashire. Plaintiffs faced with mass-tort litigation will seek MDL as a
matter of routine because the Court narrowed personal jurisdiction. 286 Consciously
or unconsciously, the Court distorted due process analysis to achieve a cost savings
solution to mass-tort litigation. 287 That would seem to be the job of Congress. In
fact, Congress has addressed mass-torts when it enacted CAFA288 and § 1369.289
The fact that those provisions did not apply to the litigation in BMS suggests that
the Court’s use of personal jurisdiction to force litigants into MDL was illegitimate
as a matter of policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Open the morning paper and you can find attacks on the rule of law. As I wrote
this paper, for example, President Trump railed against former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions and the Department of Justice for filing criminal charges against
Trump loyalists up for reelection to Congress. 290 Happily, such blatant attacks on
the rule of law get the attention of the news media and the public. 291
As I have argued in Animating Civil Procedure, the Court has more subtly
eroded the rule of law with its civil procedure decisions. 292 Public outrage at the
Court’s procedural decisions is unlikely. 293 But the aggregate effect of those
decisions is a powerful assault on the rule of law. 294 A full set of formal substantive
rights is worth little without a convenient forum in which to bring one’s claim, a
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forum that allows access to information necessary to make one’s case. 295
BMS’s breadth is open to debate. Perhaps, as Professors Bradt and Rave have
argued, it has little lasting effect on most lawsuits. 296 But its reinsertion of
federalism into the due process analysis narrows jurisdiction in some meaningful
class of cases.297 Further, looking at only one decision at a time ignores the larger
impact on access to justice.298 Finally, even the members of the Court advanced
multiple policies in BMS, the winners are mega-corporations, the losers, injured
plaintiffs.299
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